The new 2025 National Security Strategy of the United States, signed this week by that country’s president, Donald Trump, reorganizes Washington’s priorities around a central objective: preserving US supremacy in the face of China’s rise and preventing the emergence of any competing power in the Western Hemisphere.
According to Elias Jabbour, a geographer and economics professor at UERJ (Rio de Janeiro State University), in an interview with TV 247 , this movement is not limited to containing Beijing: it also includes a direct offensive to limit Brazil whenever the country tries to build its own national project.
Jabbour stated that the document functions as a double containment plan. “Trump wants to contain China and also Brazil,” he said, describing Trump’s initiative as an attempt by the US to supposedly “put its house in order,” while Washington’s global leadership is in decline.
Comparing the current moment to the administration of former US President Ronald Reagan in the 1980s, he summarized the logic of the new official text: “Trump sees the world as something very volatile to the United States, and through this released document, he seeks to try to reorganize the world in the image and likeness of the interests of the United States. He is waking up to reality.”
Jabbour associates the new US strategic design with an ongoing process of political and informational pressure on Brazil. For him, the country is already experiencing a scenario of undeclared confrontation. “I believe we have been living under a hybrid war for a long time,” he stated, projecting the practical effect of Washington’s new orientation on Brazilian domestic politics. Based on the document, he anticipates an escalation. “This hybrid war will increase its reach. For example, we can already expect, based on this document, direct interference from the United States via Big Tech in the next elections,” he said. In the professor’s assessment, the control of information flows, digital platforms, and public debate environments is now being treated, in practice, as an instrument to contain political projects that do not align with Washington’s strategy for the hemisphere. Therefore, Jabbour argues that the Brazilian electoral calendar should be seen as part of a larger dispute. According to him, “from a political point of view, it is fundamental that the Brazilian left, or those patriots in general, have a very clear understanding of what is at stake in the next elections.”
Jabbour argues that the country can no longer maintain an ambiguous position between Washington and Beijing. “It’s time for Brazil to make a decision. Are we going to have a loose relationship with China, are we going to try to stay here with one foot there and the other here?” he questioned.
He argues that China should be seen as a concrete opportunity for reindustrialization and productive repositioning.
“I believe, for example, that China can be a great external window for a reindustrialization process in Brazil, because China today is committed to this as an exporter of public goods,” he assessed. At the same time, he acknowledges that Donald Trump’s interest in Brazil could open up opportunities in specific areas, such as semiconductors or supply chains linked to Brazilian mineral reserves.
He emphasized that the core of his analysis is the Brazilian national interest as a parameter for any foreign relations. “I don’t want to close the door to the United States, I don’t want to create animosity with the United States, I want to have excellent relations with them, but we have to see what the national interest is first and foremost, right?” he stated.
Based on this criterion, Jabbour assesses that “considering the national interest, I see China as the most ideal strategic partner for our interests.”
According to Jabbour, one of the areas where Brazil’s restraint manifests itself is the competition for rare earth elements and other strategic minerals present in South America. Jabbour observes that there is already potential demand, especially from the United States, for these raw materials. In his view, Brazil’s response should be to create a strategy to internalize processing chains and add value to natural resources.
“Brazil should seek, with or without the Chinese, through import substitution or through research in science, technology and innovation, to internalize the production chains that process these earth elements,” he argued. Recalling that China dominates both the reserves and the processing of rare earth elements, he points out the difference in trajectory between Beijing and Brasília. “China today holds between 60 and 70% of the international reserves of rare earth elements and is responsible for 90% of their processing, right? So how did they manage it and Brazil can’t?” he questioned. For the professor, the country needs an “institutional framework” that protects these resources and, at the same time, converts them into the engine of a new industrial revolution.
However, Jabbour concludes that Brazil is in a strategically fragile position. “For now, Brazil has very little it can do from a political, institutional, financial, and industrial standpoint to deal with a threat like this, right? That is, a threat of direct interference, even from a military standpoint,” he assessed. He describes a country without adequate instruments to respond to the combination of hybrid warfare, economic pressure, and eventual military escalation in the region. “Brazil is a country that is unprepared to deal with this scenario. We urgently need to discuss a national project in light of this foreign threat to Brazil,” he stated.
Source: brasil247.com